

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 225061

45

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EA:WHGLEESTEEN:CB

APPROVED BY EA - MR. HABIB

S/S-JLHOGANSON

CIA - MR. SHACKLEY (SUBS)

----- 054868

R 201913Z SEP 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

S E C R E T STATE 225061

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PFOR, ID, PO, PT

SUBJ: GENERAL MOERDANI'S COMMENTS ON TIMOR

1. DURING HIS VISIT HERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAM, GENERAL MOERDANI DISCUSSED INDONESIAN POLICY TOWARDS TIMOR WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENT AND CIA OFFICERS. ALTHOUGH HIS STATEMENTS VARIED SLIGHTLY DEPENDING ON HIS INTERLOCUTOR, HE WAS RELATIVELY CONSISTENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. SUHARTO HAS ADOPTED A VERY PATIENT POLICY TOWARDS TIMOR, FREQUENTLY JUSTIFYING IT TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN QUITE IDEALISTIC TERMS SUCH AS THE IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVING CAUTIOUSLY WHILE INDONESIA IS POOR AND WEAK SO THAT THE RECORD WILL NOT HAUNT THEIR CHILDREN WHEN INDONESIA ACHIEVES GREATER STATUS. THE INDONESIANS ARE FULLY AWARE OF POTENTIAL CRITICISM AND DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 225061

QUARTERS AND IN THE US CONGRESS IF THEY SHOULD MOVE MILITARILY AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF TIMOR.

B. INDONESIA DOES NOT INTEND A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF

PORTUGUESE TIMOR AT THIS TIME, ASSUMING THERE IS NO SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD AFFECT INDONESIAN SECURITY.

IF A DECISION WERE MADE TO MOVE MILITARILY, THE INDONESIANS ESTIMATE THAT THEY COULD PACIFY THE WHOLE OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR IN A WEEK TO A MONTH USING 1100 MEN. THEY COULD TAKE THE CITY OF DILI AND THE AIRPORT, AND ESTABLISH OSTENSIBLE CONTROL IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS.

C. INDONESIA HAS OFFICERS, NCO'S, AND ENLISTED MEN OPERATING IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR WHERE THEY ARE TRYING TO BEEF UP THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE UDT AND APODETI THROUGH ARMS SUPPLY, ETC. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS IS WORTH MUCH.

D. FRETILIN HAS FIVE OR SIX COMMUNIST OR STRONGLY MARXIST INDIVIDUALS IN ITS LEADERSHIP BUT ON THE WHOLE IT IS A FAIRLY REASONABLE ORGANIZATION WITH FAR MORE PROSPECT POLITICALLY THAN THE UDT OR APODETI. IF THE FRETILIN CAN BE ISOLATED FROM EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, THEY WILL DISCOVER IN A YEAR OR SO THAT THEY HAVE NO RECOURSE EXCEPT TO DEAL WITH INDONESIA. IF THEY DO, INDONESIA MAY BE ABLE TO WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH THEM.

E. THERE IS NO MAJOR THREAT OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A CONVINCING SIGHTING OF A SUBMARINE, WHICH BY DEDUCTION WAS SOVIET, MOERDANI IS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED A LARGE NUMBER OF GUNS. MOREOVER, HE SAID THE INDONESIANS HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THE RUSSIANS OF NON-INTERVENTION. HE IS SLIGHTLY LESS SURE ABOUT THE CHINESE BECAUSE OF TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE SUBSTANTIAL CHINESE MINORITY IN TIMOR AND MACAU. IN ANY EVENT, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF EFFECTIVE SOVIET OR CHINESE INVOLVEMENT.

F. AS REFLECTED IN OTHER SOURCES, MOERDANI CONSIDERS
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 225061

PORTUGUESE PROCRASTINATION TO HAVE BEEN UNHELPFUL AND HAS NO EXPECTATION OF AUSTRALIAN OR MALAYSIAN SUPPORT FOR MILITARY PACIFICATION.

2. MOERDANI ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WERE MANY INDONESIANS WITH A MORE ALARMIST VIEW OF THE SITUATION, AND HE DID NOT FLATLY RULE OUT A SHIFT IN SUHARTO'S POSITION. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION HE LEFT, HOWEVER, WAS OF A RATHER SKILLFUL, PATIENT STRATEGY; I.E.: (A) AVOIDANCE IF POSSIBLE OF CRUDE, LARGE-SCALE INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST PORTUGUESE TIMOR, (B) RELATIVELY DISCRETE, COVERT INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIONS TO ISOLATE AND PRE-SUMABLY PENETRATE FRETILIN SO THAT IT WILL BE FORCED TO

COME TO TERMS WITH INDONESIA IN ABOUT A YEAR'S TIME; AND
(C) CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A QUICK SURGICAL MILITARY

ACTION TO TAKE OVER IF SITUATION NECESSITATES. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONAL OPINION, MILITARY PERSONNEL, SELFDETERMINATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 SEP 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE225061
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA:WHGLEYSTEE:CB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750327-0406
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197509105/baaaacem.tel
Line Count: 115
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 JUN 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: MASS, PFOR, ID, PO, PT, (MOERDANI)
To: JAKARTA
CANBERRA
LISBON
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006